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Abstract
This paper examines the "open door" {Infitah) policy of the Egyptian government
toward direct foreign investment (DPI) and the response of foreign investors to that
policy during 1974-1989. The impact of the incentives created by the policy on the
characteristics of approved projects as well as the role of external factors are
analyzed. Also, an attempt is made to assess the contribution of DPI to the Egyptian
economy in this period. The evidence reviewed in this paper show that the amount of
foreign capital attracted by Infitah has so far remained rather limited and,
moreover, its growth has substantially slowed down in the 1980s. While factors such
as bureaucratic inefficiency may be responsible for the low level of DPI throughout
the period, the factor most responsible for the slow down in the 1980s seems to be
the country's serious foreign debt crisis since the early 1980s.

I. Introduction
This paper examines the policies of the Egyptian government toward direct
foreign investment (DFI) and the response of foreign investors to those policies
during 1974-1989. The impact of the incentives created by these policies on the
characteristics of approved projects as well as the role of external factors are
analyzed. Also, an attempt is made to assess the contribution of DFI to the Egyptian
economy in this period. The aim is to identify the main factors limiting the
benefits that Egypt can derive from foreign capital and technology.
Since the early 1970s Egyptian policy makers have tried to implement a policy of
"open door" {Infitah) aimed at revitalizing Egypt's economy through increased
liberalization of the country's extensive public sector and, more importantly,
through an enhanced role for the private sector. Given Egypt's abundance of labor
and scarcity of capital and advanced technology, from the outset direct foreign
investment was seen as a key to the success of the Open Door policy. Through Law 43
of 1974, the cornerstone of Infitah, foreign investors were encouraged to play an
important role in capital formation in Egypt. However, outside the petroleum sector
the response of foreign investors, particularly Western multinationals, has been
rather lukewarm, and whatever interest existed on their part in the late 1970s seems
to have largely evaporated since the mid-1980s. In the last several years, not only
has the rate of investment under Law 43 substantially declined, the share of
foreigners in such investments has also considerably diminished. These trends have
raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the Open Door policy and have
marred the prospects for the future development of Egypt through further expansion
of the private sector.
The decline of DFI in Egypt has come at a time when the emergence of a serious
external debt problem has severely restrained the country's economic growth. This
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coincidence, which has also been observed in other indebted developing countries,
requires close scrutiny since one expects DFI to be highly profitable when the host
country is badly in need of foreign exchange. In fact, the view that DFI is a
substitute for foreign borrowing has been the basis of a number of recent calls, in
Egypt and elsewhere, for debt-equity swaps as a solution to the external debt problem
of developing countries. However, the use of debt-equity swaps among heavily
indebted countries has so far remained rather limited and DFI and foreign borrowing
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seem to be more complements than substitutes. In this sense, understanding the
causes of the decline of DFI in heavily indebted countries can shed light on the
conditions for the success of the proposed schemes for debt-equity swap such as the
one being considered in Egypt.
The past studies of Infitah have pointed out a number of reasons behind Egypt's
difficulties in attracting foreign and domestic private capital. These reasons
include the rise of "Islamic fundamentalism," persistence of bureaucratic obstacles,
underdevelopment of Egypt's infrastructure, and lack of "political will" on the part
of the government or "seriousness" on the part of foreign investors. The evidence
reviewed in this paper shows that while most of these factors may have adversely
affected DFI in Egypt in the past two decades, they are not among the prime reasons
for its decline in the 1980s. Instead, the main culprit seems to have been the
foreign exchange crisis that developed as a result of the debt overhang in the 1980s.
Besides weakening the domestic markets, the crisis seems to have reduced the ability
of the government to assure foreign investors that Egypt's economic policies will
remain favorable toward private economic activity and profit repatriation. This
observation implies that DFI and debt-equity swaps are unlikely to help much in
easing the ongoing foreign exchange crisis. Rather, it will be the resolution of the
balance of payments problems through other mechanisms such as export expansion and
debt reduction that may bring back to Egypt the more sizable levels of private
investment experienced during the 1979-1981 period, when the country was enjoying
rising foreign revenues.
In the last few years, following a standby agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1987, the government of Egypt has rescheduled its external
debt and has initiated a number of important policy reforms to change the climate for
private investment and help mitigate the country's serious economic problems. In
particular, the exchange rate and tariff systems have been overhauled to liberalize
foreign trade and increase the role of the market in the economy. Also, a new
investment code—Law 230 of July 1989—has been introduced to improve the procedures
for regulating both foreign and domestic investment. Naturally, the success of these
reforms depends on how well they deal with the shortcomings of the past policies and
address the fundamental problems currently facing economic activity in Egypt. In
this regard, by assessing the performance of the past policies, the present study is
expected to help shed light on the possible outcomes of the recent reforms.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the necessary
background regarding the history of foreign investment and economic conditions in
Egypt. Section III examines the evolution of Egypt's foreign investment code and the
response of foreign investors. Section IV analyzes the characteristics of Law 43
projects and evaluates their impact on the Egyptian economy. Section V focuses on
the causes of the decline in investment under law 43 in the 1980s. Finally, Section
VI contains a summary and some concluding remarks.
II. Background
Egypt entered the twentieth century under the British rule with an economy
highly specialized in cotton production. Except for the industries and
infrastructure directly related to the production and export of cotton, very few
sectors were developed. Moreover, the industrial, financial, agricultural, and urban
land companies that did develop were mostly dominated by foreigners, particularly the
g
British and the French. The nationalist movement that began to shape the economic
policies in Egypt after World War I tried to mobilize domestic capital and to
encourage industrialization through import substitution. However, Egyptian
industrialists and bankers continued to seek the cooperation of foreign capital,
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which maintained its dominant position in the country's industry and finance. The
moderate import substitution policies of post-World War I met with some success,
particularly after World War II, and eventually resulted in increased economic
g
diversification. However, income per capita in 1952 was no higher than what it had
gbeen in 1914 and income distribution was perhaps more concentrated.
Following the tripartite British, French, and Israeli aggression against Egypt
in 1956, all British and French property was sequestrated. Subsequently, foreign
investment came to a halt and by the early 1960s, after a number of wide-ranging
socialist laws were enacted, no foreign capital remained in the country except for
small amounts in a few oil-exploration and pharmaceutical joint ventures with the
government. The socialist laws also strangled the domestic private investment.
Almost all large industrial and financial establishments became state-owned and
foreign trade was entirely monopolized by the government. These changes led to gross
inefficiencies in the economic system which, together with a series of political
difficulties mounted in the 1960s and early 1970s, considerably slowed down Egypt's
pace of economic growth.
In the early 1970s, the Egyptian government under President Sadat was convinced
that a major reorientation of the economy toward greater participation by domestic
and foreign private investors was essential for resolving the country's economic
dilemmas. Following Egypt's success in the 1973 war with Israel, the stage was ready
for new policies to be introduced. This process led to the enactment of Law 43 and
the birth of the Open Door policy in June of 1974. The shift in Egypt's
international alliances, implied by the new policy, brought about foreign aid and
cooperation from the West as well as from the oil-rich Arab countries. The
contemporaneous rise in the price of oil, on the other hand, enhanced the flow of
Arab capital into Egypt and increased job opportunities for Egyptians in other Arab
countries. By late 1970s, revenues from oil exports, foreign aid, remittances from
workers abroad, and earnings from the Suez Canal—which had reopened after the 1973
War—brought Egypt unprecedented amounts of foreign exchange and rising incomes.
The overall effects of the above developments on the Egyptian economy can be
seen in Table 1, which presents the data concerning gross domestic product, gross
investment, and the balance of payments situation of Egypt since 1974. Large
injections of foreign exchange in the second half of the 1970s allowed greater
capacity utilization and substantial increases in investment, leading to rapid GDP
growth. Although foreign debt was being accumulated at relatively high rates, the
sharp increases in the foreign exchange receipts from various sources made the future
of Egypt look quite optimistic.
However, the above picture started to change in the early 1980s when it became
clear that the high price of oil would not be sustained for long. While Egypt's
large import bill proved difficult to reduce, foreign exchange revenues, which were
largely dependent on the price of oil, started to decline and the burden of the
external debt began to loom ominously in the horizon. Table 1 shows that while real
investment and the growth rate of real GDP have been declining since 1983, Egypt's
balance of payments has continued to deteriorate. Table 2, where the structure of
expenditure on GDP is presented, further reveals that the continued growth of private
consumption and the relative decline of exports have been the main culprits behind
the widening of the resource gap in the mid-1980s. Although the government has more
or less managed to limit its consumption expenditure in recent years, private
consumption has remained strong largely due to a high growth rate of population as
well as an enormous consumer subsidy program financed by the government.
Given Egypt's population growth rate of about 2.5% per year, the GDP growth
figures for 1986-1988 shown in Table 1 indicate the possibility of a stagnant or even
declining GDP per capita during those years. This observation, together with the
mounting foreign debt and the rapidly declining investment level reflect the
significant resource constraints and pessimism that have come to prevail in Egypt
since the mid-1980s. The recent successes in debt rescheduling and policy reform,
however, provide some hopeful signals for the possibility of improvements in the
country's economic conditions during the 1990s.
The stagnation of foreign exchange revenues and the sluggishness of the decline
in imports that led to the rapid rise of external debt in the 1980s were to some
extent due to the foreign exchange policies of the Egyptian government. Since these
policies have also affected the amount and pattern of investment under Law 43, in the
rest of this section we briefly review their main charateristics.
Egypt has followed a multi-tier exchange rate policy which has been constantly
in a state of flux. However, the general characteristics of the foreign exchange
system since the mid-1970s can be summarized by distinguishing three official foreign
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exchange pools and a "black market" one (see Table 3). The official pools consist
of the Central-Bank pool, the commercial-banks pool, and the "own-exchange" pool.
The sources of foreign exchange supply for the Central-Bank pool are revenues from
the Suez Canal and from the exports of oil, cotton, and rice. The resources
available in this pool are used for imports of commodities deemed basic such as
wheat, flour, and fertilizers. Most imports of the public sector, certain imports of
the private sector, and authorized capital transactions are channeled toward the
commercial-banks pool, which receives its resources from the foreign exchange
earnings and transfers of public and private sectors. Direct imports by the private
sector to a large extent depend on the own-exchange pool, which is mainly supplied by
tourist receipts and workers' remittances. It should be noted that the exact receipt
and payment categories covered by the foreign exchange pools described above have
been changing over time and especially the line between the own-exchange and black
market pools has been quite fluid. Moreover, at times individual pools have been
partitioned into several segments with somewhat different exchange rates applying to
each segment.
The evolution of the typical exchange rates (U.S. dollars per Egyptian pound,
LE) applicable to each pool since 1976 can be seen in Table 3. The officially set
basic exchange rate, which applies to the Central-Bank pool, has always been kept
highly overvalued. The commercial-banks rate (formerly called the parallel rate) has
also been directly or indirectly set by the government. But, for several years prior
to 1981, it was maintained close to the "free-market" (own-exchange and black-market)
rates. In that period, the abundance of foreign exchange maintained the free-market
rates at relatively high levels and even caused them to appreciate in 1977. Since
1981, however, the free-market rates have rapidly depreciated, but the
commercial-banks rate has lagged behind and, at times, has become quite overvalued
(see the last column of Table 3).
Since the late 1970s, there have been several attempts to unify the numerous
exchange rates in Egypt, but most of them have proven temporary and ineffective. In
1979, the basic and commercial-banks rates were unified, but until August 1989 the
basic rate was kept at LE1=$1.43, which by then amounted to more than 3.5 times the
commercial-banks rate. In the first half of 1985, the commercial-banks rate, after
being maintained at LE1=$1.20 since 1980 and appreciating to more than 160% of the
free-market rates, was substantially devalued. But it was allowed to appreciate
again and by the end of 1986 it was about 140% of the free-market rates. In May
81987, in connection with the IMF standby agreement, once more the government brought
the commercial-banks rate closer to the free-market rate and set up a committee of
bankers to determine it on a daily basis. This time the commercial rate has
generally been kept close to the free-market rate, although at times the differential
has reached over 20% of the latter. Due to the importance of the commercial-banks
rate from a business point of view, it is quite likely that these discrepancies
together with the continued uncertainty about the commitment of the government to
unify and liberalize the exchange rate system have significantly contributed to the
high demand for imports and lagging supply of exports, thus exacerbating Egypt's
external debt and resource constraint problems in the past decade.
III. The Evolution of the Foreign Investment Code in Egypt and the Response
of Foreign Investors
The renewed interest of the Egyptian government in foreign investment was
officially expressed for the first time in Law 65 of 1971 concerning the investment
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of Arab funds in Egypt. Although this law mainly addressed the issue of Arab
foreign investment in Egypt, it also welcomed non-Arab foreign capital subject to
approval by the cabinet and ratification by the President. Law 65 together with the
new constitution of 1971 and a series of legislative changes that gave guarantees for
the "protection of private property" generated a great deal of interest among Western
as well as Arab business communities toward investment in Egypt. Although very few
foreign investment projects were implemented in the early 1970s, the Egyptian
government was convinced that a more comprehensive foreign investment code would
attract substantial amounts of foreign capital. This process led to the enactment of
Law 43 of 1974, which opened up the door for foreign investment from both Arab and
non-Arab sources.
To facilitate the process of foreign investment and to implement the provisions
of the Law, a new organization, named the General Authority for Investment and Free
Zones, was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy. The Authority
was charged with the responsibility of identifying appropriate projects, contacting
foreign investors, assessing the proposed projects, and supervising the process of
investment, operation, and profit repatriation of the approved projects. The
Authority was also expected to study Egypt's investment laws and regulations and to
make recommendations for improving the foreign investment code.
Law 43 did not stipulate a strict minimum percentage of local participation for
investment in most branches of the economy. However, it conveyed a clear preference
for joint ventures by requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the members of the
Authority's Board of Directors for approving projects with no local participation.
Also, construction contracting companies and banks dealing in local currency were
required to have a majority Egyptian equity. The only sector from which foreign
(non-Arab) investors were completely barred was housing.
Although the stated intention of Law 43 was to attract foreign technology as
well as foreign capital, it did not deal much with the problems of technology
transfer. Transfer of technology was encouraged as part of DPI packages by
permitting royalty payments to be included in the initial invested capital. Some
discretion was also given to the Investment Authority to deal with the technology
content of proposed projects on a case by case basis through some adjustments in the
duration of the tax exemption period. However, the Law did not discuss the issues
of "unbundling" DPI and imports of technology by Egyptian enterprises without
foreign participation.
The incentives and guarantees for foreign investment included: (1) a promise to
refrain from nationalization and confiscation of invested capital except by judicial
procedures within the framework of international convention; (2) exemption from a
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number of regulations restricting labor relations, especially wage and salary
payments, in the rest of the economy; (3) a 5 to 8 year exemption from profit tax;
(4) a deferment on the payments of customs duties; and (5) a permission to import
without a license (but subject to inspection) the equipment, machinery, and material
considered "necessary" for the installation and operation of the projects. However,
there was no guarantee of foreign exchange provision for imports or profit
repatriation. In particular, while clearly applying the highly overvalued basic
exchange rate to the incoming capital, the law was vague about the particular
exchange rate among the multitude of prevailing ones to be applied to the
repatriation of capital and profits. Also, the salaries of expatriate employees were
made subject to the general income tax in Egypt.
Another important provision of Law 43 was the designation of certain areas
around the country as "free zones." The purpose of the free zones was to encourage
export-oriented investment in Egypt by providing the possibility of storing,
packaging, processing, or manufacturing goods in a transit situation without having
17
to go through the customs process or to pay the usual duties and taxes. Each free
zone was endowed with a board of directors to manage the zone and to supervise the
flow of goods, capital, and personnel into and out of the zone in order to ascertain
proper conduct of the projects and to ensure the insulation of the rest of the
economy from these zones. Movement of goods between the free zones and the rest of
the country was made subject to the procedures governing the usual imports and
exports, while the movement of goods between the free zones and the rest of the world
was made only subject to an annual duty of less than 1%. Transit goods, however,
were exempted from such a fee. To distinguish between the projects in the free zones
and those in the rest of the country, below we will refer to the latter as "inland"
projects.
In the fiscal year 1974/1975, following the enactment of Law 43, well over a
11
hundred projects were approved (see Table 4). However, this early enthusiasm
subsided somewhat in 1975/1976 due to several problems that foreign investors
discovered in the provisions of the Law. In particular, it was recognized that the
procedures for the approval of investments and their imported inputs, the regulations
and the exchange rates applying to the repatriation and reinvestment of capital and
profits, and the tax rule applying to profits and to the salaries of foreign
employees were either ambiguous or problematic. Soon a process of dialogue between
the Egyptian government and the representatives of foreign investors from various
countries started and problem areas were closely studied. This process culminated in
the amendment of Law 43 by Law 32 of 1977. Among other things, the amendment set
rules for expediting the approval procedure for the proposed projects, opened up new
fields of investment, exempted the salaries of foreign employees from taxation in
Egypt, and made the "highest prevailing official exchange rate" (i.e., the
commercial-banks rate) apply to all movements of capital and profits.
Table 4 shows that a backlog of projects with large proposed investments was
approved in 1976/77. But, surprisingly, this was by no means a consequence of the
amendment in Law 43. In fact, the bulk of those approvals came well before the
18
enactment of Law 32, perhaps as an encouragement for foreign investors. Yet,
contrary to the expectations of the government, during the first couple of years
after the amendment the volume of proposed investments declined.
Despite the fact that the legal framework of foreign investment in Egypt did not
change after 1977, the interest of foreign investors was renewed in 1979 and project
approvals began to rise rapidly. However, since the fiscal year 1981/82, with the
exception of 1983/84, the proposed capital of new projects approved under Law 43 has
19
declined. This decline has been so rapid that by 1985/86 the nominal capital of
inland projects approved annually had fallen to about one third of its 1980/81 level.
The third column of Table 4, where these nominal values are converted to US dollars
12
at the commercial-banks exchange rate, shows that the decline in terms of US dollars
20
may have been as much as 80% of the 1980/81 level. Although the 1986/87 and 1988
data show an improvement over the previous two years, they are still far below the
approval rate at the beginning the decade. Note that a more or less similar trend
can be observed in the case of free-zone projects.
In the 1980s, not only did the rate of proposed investments under Law 43
decline, foreigners also sharply reduced their participation in such projects. This
can be seen in Table 5, which shows the data concerning the participation of the
nationals of different countries in Law 43 projects. Note that even Arab countries,
which after a period of withdrawal in the wake of the Camp David Accord in 1979 had
revived their investment in Egypt by 1982, significantly lowered their participation
in the mid-1980s. As a result, at least since 1984 Egyptian capital has come to pick
up about 70% of the equity of inland projects, while in 1977 this share was only
21
50%. However, as in the case of total investment approvals, there seems to be some
indication in the most recent data that this situation may have started to change.
These changes, as we will argue below, are likely to be the consequence of debt
rescheduling and policy reforms implemented since 1987.
Matters are somewhat different in the case of free-zone projects, where Egyptian
22
equity participation is much smaller than among the inland ones. In particular, in
the mid-1980s the share of Arab countries in the free-zone capital considerably
increased. This was partly because Egyptian investors—who typically use these zones
for storing their import merchandise awaiting the customs process—curtailed their
activities due to the increasing shortage of foreign exchange. But, as indicated by
the 1989 data, the recent changes in the foreign exchange policy and availability may
have made the free zones somewhat more attractive to Egyptians businesses again.
Project approvals, of course, do not necessarily imply actual investment. In
13
fact, for many projects, obtaining approval has been the end of the road; either
investors had lost their interest in the projects or they had found the
implementation far more difficult and costly than indicated by the initial
assessments. The government of Egypt has frequently voiced concern about the
seriousness of some of foreign investors and has weeded out many of the inactive
23
projects. However, at least until recently, this did not help speed up the
implementation process. In fact, between 1985 and 1987 the capital stock of Law 43
projects under operation grew very sluggishly (see Table 6). Note that there was a
virtual stagnation in the free zones and the capital stock of operating inland
projects grew more slowly than the approved capital (see Table 7). These
observations show that the slowdown of the actual investment in the mid-1980s must
have been quite strong. The trend between 1987 and 1989, however, seems somewhat
more promising.
It is important to note that after 1985 the actual capital formation in Law 43
projects has also declined relative to the total investment in the economy. This
tendency can be seen in the last column of Table 8, which reports the WPI(wholesale
price index)-deflated value of investments in operating nonfinancial projects as a
percentage of the WPI-deflated gross fixed capital formation since 1974 in the
24
country as a whole. The fifth column of this table further shows that the same
result is obtained if the comparison is restricted to the capital formation in the
"relevant" sectors; i.e., the sectors to which Law 43 projects were expected to
25
contribute most. Note that these figures indicate that while the role of Law 43
projects in the growth of Egypt's capital stock has not been negligible, it has
remained rather modest and, if the 1985-1987 trend continues, it may become quite
marginal.
The last row of Table 6 indicates that by the end of June 1989 Egypt had
received a total of $8545.8 million worth of investment under Law 43, of which
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$5112.2 million was equity and the rest was borrowed domestically and abroad.
Although these levels of investment and equity are not by any means negligible, it
should be kept in mind that, given the pattern of foreign participation, only about
$1850 million of the equity has been contributed by non-Egyptians. Moreover, these
figures include a large amount of financial capital which does not directly
contribute to productive capacity. Excluding financial projects, the volume of
investment diminishes to $6075.9 million with $2816.2 million worth of equity and
about $1019 million foreign participation. Thus, 15 years after the initiation of
Infitah, the amount of foreign equity actually invested in Egypt stood at about $0.8
billion in the form of financial capital and just over $1 billion in the form of
fixed capital, which are not particularly large when compared to the stock of DPI in
27
many other developing countries with active foreign investment policies.
The new investment law introduced in 1989 has a close resemblance to Law 43
and its main purpose is to extend the benefits of the latter to domestic capital by
unifying the regulations applicable to all private investments regardless of their
sources. Law 230 maintains its predecessor's no-guarantee clause for the
repatriation of profits. However, it expands the possibilities for tax exemptions
and especially stipulates a 2-year extension in the tax holiday if the local content
of a project exceeds 60%. It also obliges the Investment Authority to facilitate the
project-application procedure and speed up its decision-making process. Furthermore,
it provides a legal vehicle for debt-equity swaps by allowing foreign nationals
acquire existing domestic equity. In the new law, an attempt is also made to
prohibit the imposition of price or profitability controls on approved projects.
But, this prohibition is made essentially ineffective by making exceptions for cases
deemed "necessary" by the Council of Ministers. Finally, unlike Law 43, the new
investment code permits foreign investment in the housing sector, while excluding
financial and consulting projects from its privileges.
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IV. Characteristics of Law 43 Projects
In this section, we review the characteristics of Law 43 projects to examine the
response foreign investors to the Open Door policy in greater detail. Issues of
interest that can be analyzed here given the availability of data for the projects
are the trends in their wage rates, employment, output, sectoral composition, factor
intensity, profitability, and foreign exchange balance.
IV. 1. Sectoral Composition of Investments in Law 43 Projects
One of the most controversial aspects of Infitah since its inception has been
the sectoral structure of capital in Law 43 projects. In the first decade of
Infitah, financial projects dominated the approved investment portfolio (see Table 9)
and, since such projects were relatively easy to implement, their share in the
capital of operating projects was even more significant (see Table 10). This aspect
of Law 43 projects was seen by many critics as an evidence that the Open Door policy
ultimately encourages "unproductive" services and speculation, while neglecting-
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industrialization. However, as the trend and later developments in the pattern of
Law 43 investments indicate, this concern should no longer be a serious one. In
fact, industry has been assuming an increasing role among Infitah enterprises and
since 1980 has clearly outweighed finance in terms of share in the capital of
approved projects.
The early rise of finance companies among Law 43 projects seems, to some extent,
natural since, given the limitations of the existing state-owned banks, new financial
institutions were needed to facilitate the implementation of projects in other
sectors. Most of the finance projects were, indeed, investment companies and banks
designated to operate in foreign currency, where other projects could open foreign
currency accounts and maintain the funds necessary for their purchases and transfers
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abroad. However, the proliferation of finance projects had another, perhaps more
important, reason as well: the foreign exchange boom toward the end of the 1970s
brought quick and high profits to businesses financing imports. The decline of
foreign exchange earnings and inflows in the 1980s, on the other hand, reduced the
private sector's interest in creating new foreign currency banks. In fact, after a
backlog of proposals for financial projects were approved in 1988, the government's
omission of financial projects from the list of those covered by Law 230 of 1989 did
29
not generate much opposition in Egypt's business community.
The observation that in Egypt, industry rather than finance and services has
been gaining weight in the portfolio of Law 43 investments is quite interesting
because this trend seems to be exactly the opposite of the one observed in the
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structure of DPI in most other countries. However, a close examination of the data
reveals that this difference is partly due to the fact that the bulk of Law 43
capital belongs to Egyptian nationals, who have reduced their rate of investment in
service projects more than in the industrial ones. Thus, the rise in the share of
industry in the foreign part of Law 43 investments is actually muct smaller than
indicated by Tables 9 and 10. The rest of the difference is essentially a
consequence of the decline in Arab investment, which has a significant presence in
Egypt. This decline has particularly hurt service and finance projects because these
are the fields in which Arab investors have comparative advantage and, therefore,
have concentrated their activities. These facts can be seen in Table 11, where we
have compiled the shares of five country groups in the sectorally-disaggregatcd
capital of inland projects approved by December 31st of 1984 and 1987. As this table
shows, during the mid-1980s non-Arab countries have increased their participation in
finance and service projects much more than in the industrial ones. In fact,
combining this data with the cumulative volumes of approved investment in 1984 and
1987 shows that between these two years the share of services in non-Arab DPI in
17
Egypt has increased from 26.1% to 30.6%, while the corresponding share for industry
has declined from 46.8% to 45.9%. Thus, the trend in the sectoral pattern of
non-Arab DFI in Egypt has more or less been similar to the one observed in the rest
31
of the world.
An important reason why Egyptian investors have maintained their interest in
construction and industrial projects more than in service and finance projects is the
relaxation of labor regulations under Law 43. The labor laws applicable to the
formal-sector companies in the rest of the economy impose restrictions on wage and
salary payments and require worker representation on the board of directors. As a
result, these laws tend to affect manufacturing and construction firms, which must be
labor intensive if they are to be profitable, more than formal finance and service
enterprises, which are usually capital and skill intensive. In the case of
construction projects, however, the large and rising share of Egyptians has another,
perhaps more important reason as well: Winning construction contracts requires a
great deal of familiarity with the local environment and bureaucracy, and this is an
asset in which domestic entrepreneurs have a clear advantage. We will return to
these issues below when we examine other aspects of Law 43 projects.
To see how Law 43 projects have affected the level of investment in individual
sectors of the Egyptian economy, in Table 8 we have computed the shares of each
project category (except finance) in the total post-1974 fixed capital formation of
its relevant sectors. As the table shows, most of these shares have remained rather
small and have started to decline after 1985. Only construction projects, which
comprise a relatively small percentage of the Law 43 portfolio, seem to have captured
a major share in their corresponding sector. However, given the stagnation of
Egypt's construction sector during the 1980s (see Table 12) and the very large and
rapidly rising share of domestic capital among construction projects (Table 11), it
seems that in this sector. Law 43 has mostly attracted investments that would have
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taken place anyway. In particular, many domestic entrants, as well as reentrants, to
the construction sector in the 1980s have tried to constitute themselves under the
foreign investment code in order to take advantage of its provisions.
In the free zones, as Table 13 shows, the bulk of investment has been approved
for finance, storage, and other service projects. Many of these projects have been
used as transit facilities for goods produced elsewhere and destined for Arab
countries. The rest have mostly been channels of importing goods into Egypt, rather
than the means of producing goods for export. In recent years, many of the free-zone
projects, particularly the storage ones, have closed down or abandoned their
activities because of import reductions in Egypt and other Arab countries. As a
result, the total number of projects approved for the free zones has declined and
their total real capital has virtually stagnated. This observation, as well as the
short gestation period of financial and storage projects, also explains the high
implementation rate among approved free-zone investments documented in Table 7.
Note that the limited role of industrial projects in the free zones reflects the
weak competitiveness of Egyptian manufacturing in world markets, which, to some
extent, is the consequence of currency overvaluation.
IV. 2. Employment
One of the important goals of Infitah was to encourage private entrepreneurs to
create productive employment for Egypt's rapidly growing workforce. The success of
Law 43 in this respect has been mixed. According to Table 14, which presents the
available data on total employment in Law 43 projects, by 1989 inland and free-zone
operating projects had created a total of 173,200 jobs. Although the 1989 data for
the total employment in Egypt is not available, a simple extrapolation from previous
years shows that only an insignificant fraction (less than 1.5%) must have been
employed in Law 43 projects. Restricting attention to the relevant sectors, which
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employ about 70% of Egypt's labor force, hardly changes this picture (see the columns
under RSEl in Table 14). Even when agriculture is dropped from the list of the
relevant sectors, which leaves only about 33% of the total labor force for comparison
purposes, the share of Law 43 employment in the labor market remains rather
tangential (see the columns under RSE2). However, in terms of the increase in
employment since 1974, the role of Law 43 seems to be more tangible (see the columns
under RSE3). This role has been especially significant in the 1980s when more
employment-generating (nonfinancial) Law 43 projects started their operations and the
rest of the economy slowed down. In fact, between 1979 and 1987, Law 43 projects
added 102,300 jobs to the Egyptian economy, which is almost 15% of the total new jobs
generated during the same period in the relevant sectors except agriculture. Note
that according to Table 14 employment creation by inland projects between 1987 and
mid-1989 was also rather considerable.
Two caveats are in order concerning the above assessment of the role of Law 43
projects in the Egyptian labor market. First, as pointed out above in the case of
investment data, it is difficult to ascertain how many of the Law 43 jobs would not
have been created in the absence of the policy. Second, the employment figures in
Table 14 include the foreign workers hired by the projects. Unfortunately, no data
about the share of foreigners in the total employment of operating projects is
available. However, the available projected employment figures for projects approved
up to the end of 1982, shown in Table 15, indicate that this share must be quite
small (less that 2%). Thus, correcting for the presence of foreign employees should
not change the implication of our observations concerning employment.
Table 16 shows that from a sectoral point of view. Law 43 employment has become
increasingly industrial, which is consistent with the sectoral composition of
investments. Also, in line with our previous findings, industrial projects turn out
to be second to the construction ones in terms of the share in the total employment
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of the relevant sectors. This comparison is made in Table 17 where employment and
wages in Law 43 enterprises at the end of 1987 are presented. Note that operating
projects account for 8.9% of employment in the construction sector and 4.6% of
employment in the industrial sector. These shares would rise to 139.5 and 12.1,
respectively, if the bases are the 1974-1987 increases in sectoral employments. Note
that, as pointed out before, total construction activity in Egypt did not grow much
between 1974 and 1987 and it is quite likely that in this sector Law 43 projects have
basically replaced the existing jobs.
Finally, Table 14 shows that since 1985 the projected employment in approved
projects has declined. This indicates that although during the 1980s parts of the
Egyptian labor market may have benefited from Law 43 investments in a tangible way,
the prospects for further increases in such benefits does not seem to be particularly
bright in the foreseeable future.
IV.3. Wages
Wages paid by the projects reflect the type of jobs and incomes generated by Law
43 projects. Table 18 summarizes the available data regarding the average wage rates
expected to be paid by approved projects as well as those actually paid by the
operating ones. Note that the average wage rate in the operating inland projects was
initially much higher than the average wage rate in the relevant sectors, but in the
1980s it has fallen far behind. There is no comparable data for free-zone projects
before 1986, but the table shows that in the second half of the 1980s those projects
have been paying relatively high wages. The main reason for this wage pattern is the
dominance of finance and service enterprises among inland projects during the first
decade of Infitah and among free-zone project throughout the period. As can be seen
in Table 17, finance and service projects typically pay very high salaries compared
to the ones in other sectors. The reason is that most formal jobs in these two
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sectors, especially in finance, require highly skilled and motivated workers.
According to Table 17, in 1987, construction, finance, and service projects paid
average wages comparable with those prevailing in their corresponding sectors. In
contrast, the average wage rate in agricultural projects was much higher than the one
offered in their relevant sector. This difference is mainly due to the fact that the
jobs created by Law 43 projects in agriculture are formal and involve activities
distinct from the typical, low-pay, informal employment in that sector. In fact,
they are more similar to construction jobs and, as a result, pay similarly, too.
The average wage rate in industrial projects is also quite different from the
one in their relevant sectors. But, in this case. Law 43 wages are much lower, which
is a surprising observation because industrial projects were expected to create
relatively high-paying jobs (compare the projected wages for different activities in
Tables 15 and 17). However, this outcome may be explainable by the exemption of Law
43 companies from the restrictive labor laws applicable to the industrial firms in
the rest of the economy, especially in the public sector. The relaxation of
wage-floor'and worker-representation requirements particularly benefit manufacturing
firms intensive in unskilled labor, and it is such projects that have mostly been
implemented under Law 43. This point is confirmed by the observation that the
average wage rate in operating industrial projects is close to the unskilled
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construction wage rate. Note that the exemptions have not had the same effect on
service and finance projects because, as pointed out above, the wages and salaries of
formal jobs in those sectors are mostly bound by incentive and skill constraints
rather than by labor laws.
A comparison of projected wage rates with those actually paid provides some
insights about the types of projects that are more likely to be implemented. As
Table 17 shows, in 1987 projected wage rates in all lines of activity were higher
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than the actual ones. This is, of course, partly due to the expected inflation by
the time projects are implemented. But, note that the differential is much larger in
the case of industrial projects and rather small in the case of finance, service, and
free-zone ones. This pattern is unlikely to be entirely due to the longer gestation
period of industrial projects since a comparison of the 1987 realized wages with
those projected in 1982 (Table 15) shows that industrial wages were overestimated
even with a 5 year lead and despite the high actual inflation rates in that period.
Therefore, if one further rules out the possibility that the expectations of wage
inflation have been unrealistically high in the case of industrial projects alone, it
can be concluded that in industry, projects with less skill requirements have been
more profitable and easier to implement. This inverse relationship between
profitability and skill requirements does not seem to be important for projects in
other sectors, partly because Law 43's the relaxation of the labor regulations in not
important for them. This issue is obviously worth pursuing further in future
research because identifying the factors that make projects attractive to private
investors can be helpful in designing future policies and assessing the potentials of
proposed investments.
V.4. Factor Intensity
The question whether transnational corporations use appropriate technologies in
less developed countries or not has been the subject of a heated controversy. Our
data set, unfortunately, is rather crude and does not allow a precise comparison of
technologies used by domestic and foreign enterprises in Egypt. We, thus, restrict
our attention to a sketchy examination of capital and labor intensity in Law 43
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projects. The focus is, of course, on nonfinancial projects.
At an aggregate level, the average capital intensity of nonfinancial Law 43
projects seems to be higher than that of investments in the rest of the economy.
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This can be seen by comparing the data in Tables 8 and 14. For example, in 1987,
operating inland projects accounted for about 12% of total post-1974 investment in
the relevant sectors, while contributing no more than 9.3% of the increase in
employment even when the agricultural sector is excluded. A similar pattern can be
observed at a sectoral level, except for construction projects that may be rather labor
intensive (compare the last row of Table 8 with the columns under RSEl and RSE4
in Table 17). Note that industrial projects are only slightly more capital intensive
than their counterparts in the rest of the economy and it is mainly agricultural and
service projects that are responsible for the relatively high average capital
intensity of Law 43 investments (see also Tables 9 and 16). Interestingly, this
pattern of capital intensity seems to be directly related to the relative wage
pattern of the projects discussed above, with higher wages being associated with
greater capital intensity when compared to the relevant sectors in the rest of the
economy.
IV.5. Profitability
The Investment Authority has carried out a number of surveys to determine the
profitability and financial performance of Law 43 projects. Here, we examine the
results of the 1985 survey which are available to us and are reported in Table 19.
This survey covered about 82% of the number (and 87% of the capital) of projects
operating during 1984.
As the last column of Table 19 shows, the average profit rate of these companies
has been quite low, especially considering the inflation rates of at least 10-15% in
the early 1980s. This is particularly true in the case of agricultural and
construction projects, which are exactly the activities that have lost their shares
in the total fixed investment under Law 43 during the 1980s (see above and Tabic 10).
It should, however, be pointed out that the average profit rates mask the fact that
24
there has been a great deal of variation within each sector (see Table 19). Notably,
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most of the losing enterprises have been those subscribed by the public sector. In
fact, some of the companies fully controlled by the private sector have realized
profit rates in excess of 30% of their paid-up capital, which seem attractive even
after discounting for inflation. Nevertheless, given the fact that only a fraction
of the projects have realized such profits and given the ex ante possibility of
failure, it is understandable why investing in Egypt has had little appeal to private
investors.
IV. 6. Output and Value added
There is no direct data available concerning the value added of Law 43 projects.
However, using the profitability and wage-bill figures discussed above we may come
up with a rough estimate of this variable for 1984. Note that net profits of all
surveyed companies in 1984 were LE 153.3 million (Table 19). Since these companies
accounted for 87% of the total operating inland capital, we pro-rate the above figure
and assume that total net profits were in fact LE 176.2 million—which is likely to
be an overestimate. On the other hand, from Tables 14 and 18 we find that the wage
bill of all operating inland companies in 1984 was LE 96.0 million. Thus, the total
value added of inland projects in that year must have been about LE 272.2 million,
which amounts to 0.95% of the current GDP of the economy as a whole and 2.5% of the
GDP of the relevant sectors. These figures seem to be larger than the shares of Law
43 projects in total employment. However, they arc still quite small and, indeed,
only a fraction of the share of Infitah projects in the economy's capital formation,
reflecting, once again, the relatively high capital intensity of these projects.
Another indicator of the value added of nonfinancial Law 43 projects is the
value of their gross output, for which data is available for a number of years before
1984. Table 20 shows that even in terms of gross output these projects have
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contributed a relatively small, although increasing, share of the GDP.
The limited impact of Law 43 projects on production in Egypt may also be
inferred from the sluggish growth of the sectors where nonfinancial projects have
been concentrated (compare Tables 8, 12, and 20). This is, in a sense, not very
surprising because the structure of the Egyptian economy continues to be largely
determined by the activities of the public sector, which in the late 1980s, despite
15 years of emphasis on the development of the private sector, still accounted for
about two thirds of total investment. The only sector where government investment
has remained limited and Infitah projects have clearly enhanced growth is finance
and trade. Financial projects, in particular, have had an important impact in this
respect and have greatly facilitated financial intermediation in the private
sector. However, it should be pointed out that, at the same time, Infitah banks
have been blamed for channeling a large part of worker remittances away from
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domestic markets and toward international capital markets.
IV.7. Foreign Trade Aspects
The most disappointing aspect of operating Law 43 projects has so far been their
export performance. In 1983, out of 148 operating projects that had export plans,
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only 30 had actually exported goods valued about LE 15 million. Tourism and
service projects also earned LE 63 million worth of "invisible" exports. Thus, the
total foreign exchange earnings of Law 43 projects in 1983 was about LE 78 million
or less than 1% of foreign exchange receipts of the country in that year. The import
substitution effect of the projects is believed to have been more substantial. The
Investment Authority has estimated the import replacement contribution of Law 43
projects in 1983 at LE 887 million. Given the LE 224 million commodity imports of
these projects, their net import-saving effects amounts to LE 663 million or about 7%
of the current foreign payments of Egypt in 1983. Profit repatriations have not been
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taken into account in these figures because of lack of data for 1983. But, they are
unlikely to change the picture much since, according to one estimate, the total
repatriation between 1976 and 1985 has been LE 370 million, which is quite small
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compared to the likely foreign exchange savings during the same period.
The above figures also indicate that import substitution has by far been the
most common type of activity among Law 43 projects. Note that given the total output
value of LE 1368 million in 1983 (see Table 20), the output share of import
substitutes must have been 64.8%, with nontraded goods and exports (both visibles and
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invisibles) accounting for 23.8% and 11.4%, respectively. Lack of interest in
producing for exports seems to be related to the overvaluation of the domestic
currency during the 1980s, which has also afflicted industrial activity in the free
zones. On the other hand, import substitution projects are encouraged through high
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tariff rates and other import restrictions. The recent policy of keeping the
commercial exchange rate close to the free-market rate and reducing tariffs may
change this picture. In fact, the somewhat increased rates of project approvals for
the free zones during 1988 may be a consequence of this policy.
V. Causes of the Decline in Investment under Law 43 in the 1980s
Given that the 1977 amendment of Law 43 had removed the basic legal difficulties
in the way of foreign investment and that foreign investors had indeed considered
Egypt an attractive place for investment at least between 1979 and 1981, the question
arises as to why project approvals declined so sharply in the 1980s. The answer is
certainly not in the lack of interest on the part of the Egyptian government since
there is no evidence of any increased number of proposed projects being turned down.
However, the highly inefficient Egyptian bureaucracy may have been an important
discouraging factor. But, red-tape is by no means a new phenomenon in Egypt and it
is not clear why the situation may have worsened (if it has) in the 1980s. In fact.
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since 1977 the government has maintained that it is trying to simplify the procedures
for the approval and licensing of proposed projects by making the Investment
Authority more autonomous. Thus, while bureaucratic obstacles may have kept
foreign investment levels low from the outset of Infitah, they are unlikely to be
responsible for the observed decline in the 1980s.
A second obstacle for investment under Law 43 may have been inadequate
infrastructure. To assess the relevance of this factor for the reduction of project
approvals in the 1980s, we examine the sectoral structure of production and
investment presented in Tables 12 and 21. Note that the use of constant-price
indices in Table 12 helps us identify the sectors growing faster than the average by
their rising shares. Although the occasional changes in the base year make long-term
comparisons difficult, it can be seen that at least since 1981 the GDP shares of
infrastructural sectors—electricity, transportation and communication, and public
utilities—have substantially increased. This picture seems to conform well with the
abundant anecdotal evidence one finds in the literature and news concerning recent
42improvements in communication and other infrastructural systems in Egypt. The
sectoral investment shares given in Table 21 also confirm that until about 1983
infrastructural sectors have been enjoying an increasing priority in Egypt's
investment policies. Although some shift in investment priorities can be observed
around mid-1980s, it is unlikely that such a shift has led to an immediate
deterioration of infrastructure. Thus, the existing evidence on the whole does not
support the hypothesis that infrastructural problems have been an important cause of
the reduction in Law 43 investments since 1981.
Another factor that may have adversely affected the level of foreign investment
in Egypt is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the increased instability in the
Middle East region in the 1980s. It is possible that the wars in Lebanon and the
Persian Gulf together with the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 may have
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given rise to a concern among foreigners for the safety of their lives and property
in Egypt. However, circumstantial evidence suggests that such a concern is unlikely
to have been very important or lasted very long. One observation in this regard is
Egypt's continued political stability in the 1980s as indicated by the relative
orderliness of its parliamentary and presidential elections. Another observation is
the increase in tourism in Egypt during the 1980s, which probably would not have
happened if foreigners had perceived an increase in political instability.
Interestingly, the highest rate of growth in the number of tourists in Egypt between
1981 and 1985 (23%) belongs to the OECD countries whose share in Law 43 projects
has declined most.
The rise of interest rates in world markets in the early 1980s may also be
another reason behind the decline in DPI at that time. But, again, this factor does
not explain the continued decline of such investment in the mid-1980s, especially
when one notes that total DPI in developing countries as a whole did not fall much
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in the early 1980s and, indeed, rebounded and continued to grow after 1982.
We, finally, examine the role of Egypt's balance of payments crisis since the
early 1980s, which may provide a more plausible explanation for the decline of
foreign investment during the last decade. There are three important channels
through which balance of payments problems may affect DPI in a less developed
country. Pirst, a decline in the supply of imported capital and intermediate goods
reduces the level of income and aggregate demand, lowering the potential
profitability of new investments. Second, import shortages increase the relative
value of foreign exchange and, as a result, raise the potential gains from DPI.
Third, crisis situations raise the incentives of the government to increase explicit
or implicit taxation, especially through restrictions on capital and profit
repatriation.
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If it were not for the third effect, countries facing foreign exchange shortages
could provide incentives to make the second effect dominate the first one and, thus,
help raise the inflow of DFI. However, in situations of balance of payments crisis,
governments have difficulty guaranteeing capital and profit repatriation for the
same reasons that such situations arise in the first place: that is, the inability of
governments to commit to the repayment of external loans. Note that even when some
safeguards can be provided, a government may rationally avoid them fearing abuse
by foreign investors. For example, foreign investors may use their repatriation
privileges to facilitate capital flight, which can exacerbate the country's external
crisis. In fact, most developing countries do not guarantee full repatriation except
for export-oriented investments that generate their own foreign exchange and
contribute to external revenues. As a result, at the time of balance of payments
difficulties the risk factor for DFI rises and discourages capital inflows. This
problem is obviously more significant in countries that follow import substitution
policies because the currency overvaluation in such countries reduces the
profitability of export-oriented projects. The recent experience of the highly
45indebted less developed countries provides numerous examples of such 'outcomes.
The situation in Egypt fits the above description quite well. Law 43 and its
amendment remained purposefully vague about profit repatriation of projects that are
AC
not export oriented. Since the exchange rate applicable to commercial activities
was overvalued, there was little incentive to produce for exports and, in fact, the
free zones, which were specifically designed for this purpose, failed to grow. As a
result, the balance of payments difficulties of the 1980s discouraged private
47investment in general and foreign investment in particular. In this respect, it is
interesting to note that the rate of investment under Law 43, which had surged
around 1980 when Egypt's balance of payments situation was promising, declined
afterwards when the external position began to deteriorate. Interestingly,
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the 1989 data indicate that the investment trend of the 1980s may have begun to
change after Egypt successfully rescheduled its external debt in 1987 and started
to reform its trade and exchange rate policies.
Although the Investment Authority has not imposed any systematic ban on profit
and capital repatriation in the 1980s, the chronic shortage of foreign exchange has
worked as an impediment to the timely processing of such applications. It is
interesting to note that in anticipation of possible restrictions on profit and
capital repatriation, Infitah firms have tried to use debt rather than equity to
finance their investments. The investment authority responded to this tendency in
1981 by restricting the debt-equity ratio of small investments (less than LE 5
million) to 1:1 and that of larger investments to 2:1. The government has also
occasionally used various implicit tax or subsidy-reduction mechanisms to restrict
the profits of Infitah firms. For example, in 1981 the government substantially
raised the price of petroleum for Law 43 projects, arguing that the domestic price
was subsidized for users who did not enjoy the privileges of the foreign investment
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code. Note that while such actions themselves can be seen as factors discouraging
DFI, the phenomenon that precipitates them is the widening gap between foreign
receipts and payments.
VI. Conclusion
The available data on projects established in Egypt under Law 43 show that the
success of Infitah in attracting domestic and foreign private capital has been rather
limited. The stock of such capital accumulated over the last 15 years is still quite
small and its rate of increase has declined quite sharply since the early 1980s.
Moreover, foreigners have drastically reduced their participation in the new
projects, maintaining their equity at less than $2 billion dollars. Although
finance, construction, and manufacturing sectors have modestly benefited from Law
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43 projects in terms of investment, employment, or value added, the rest of the
economy has hardly been touched. Also, the contribution of these projects to Egypt's
balance of payments, particularly on the export side, has been minimal.
Over time, the composition of Law 43 investments has shifted in favor of
industry. However, the industrial employment opportunities created by these projects
are mostly jobs with low pay and little skill requirements. In other sectors, wages
and skill requirements of projects are higher, but so is their capital intensity as
well.
The generally weak response of foreign investors to Egypt's Infitah policy since
1974 can, perhaps, be attributed to quite a few factors, some rooted in economic
policies and others beyond the control of the government. However, in the past two
decades, the government of Egypt has taken steps in various directions to deal with
such factors. In particular, it has developed a detailed foreign investment code and
has modified it in consultation with the representatives of foreign businesses in
order to reach a satisfactory compromise and to provide guarantees for the security
of private property in Egypt. It has also attempted to upgrade the infrastructure *
and to improve the procedures for project approval and licensing in order to reduce
the costs of investing in Egypt. In the meantime, Egypt has enjoyed continued peace
and political stability, which must have been positive factors in attracting private
investors. Nevertheless, except for the 1979-1981 period. Law 43 has not attracted
much capital.
The evidence reviewed in this paper shows that the main factor behind the above
pattern of investment response is Egypt's balance of payments situation. Between
1979 and 1981, Egypt enjoyed a large inflow of foreign exchange from various sources
and, as a result, foreign investors had little reason to believe that they would have
a problem in securing imports for their projects or in repatriating their profits.
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On the other hand, the serious external debt crisis since 1981 has reduced the
ability of the government to commit to refraining from the adoption of measures that
implicitly or explicitly tax the investors. In fact, the ex post average
profitability of Law 43 firms does not seem to be particularly high and, especially,
joint ventures with the public sector have done rather poorly.
The impact of the debt-crisis on DFI has been particularly strong in Egypt
because the overvaluation of the domestic currency has reduced the profitability of
export-oriented projects, for which profit repatriation could have been less
problematic. Ironically, currency overvaluation, which is part of the import
substitution policies followed in Egypt, has also been partially responsible for the
growth of external debt and the consequent foreign exchange shortage in the 1980s.
An important implication of the above analysis is that the new investment law
promulgated in 1989 may not be of much help in bringing about additional foreign
investment, unless it is combined with other policy changes. In particular, the
debt-equity swap envisioned in the new law may not be a very successful program
unless an effective solution to the external debt problem is in sight. Fortunately,
such a solution seems to be in the making. So far, most of the debt has been
successfully rescheduled and part of it may actually be written off. Moreover, the
government has begun to implement a rather comprehensive trade and exchange-rate
liberalization policy. The persistence of the government in following this policy
remains to be seen. But, already some signs of change in the past trend of foreign
investment is evident in the 1988-89 data.
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to 14%. See A.E. Crouch ley, The Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies
and Public Debt, (Cairo: 1936; reprinted in New York: Arno Press, 1977), p. 93.
7. The share of Egyptian capital among the joint-stock companies established between
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Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984).
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10. Due to ambiguities in the calculations of the constant price indices of the
national accounts of Egypt in the 1980s, we have calculated the real GDP and
investment indices in Table 1 using the wholesale price index (WPI) reported by the
NBE (note 5 above). The NBE itself does not provide a consistent and complete set of
constant price indices. The World Bank (WB) has produced two different sets of data
in the 1987 and 1988-89 editions of World Tables, the more recent of which gives much
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surprising figure is the WB's estimate of 1.1% growth rate for the GDP deflator in
1981 when the average wage rate grew by 28.0% {NBE, 1987, Table 2/3b). The Ministry
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trend in the GDP growth figures estimated in Table 1 and with the signs of a
recession (rising share of consumption and declining share of investment in GNP)
evident in Table 2.
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11. This was, of course, to some extent foreseeable at the turn of the decade. See,
for example. Bent Hansen and Samir Radwan, Employment Opportunities and Equity
in Egypt (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1982).
12. For a detailed account of the exchange rate policy in Egypt see the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile: Egypt, 1988-89, and the International
Currency Analysis, Inc., World Currency Yearbook, 1986-1987.
13. Driscoll et al. (n. 4 above), chapter II.
14. A proposal for a separate code on the transfer of technology was suggested in
1981, but thus far no action has been taken in that regard [UNCTC, (n. 2 above), p.
267].
35
15. "The exemption from the general tax on income is conditioned upon such income
not being subject to similar taxation in the investor's home country or in the
country to which income is transferred, as the case may be" (Article 16 of Law 43,
1974). The duration of the income tax exemption begins with the first tax year
following the commencement of operations. For land reclamation and construction
projects outside the existing agricultural and urban areas, the tax exemption period
could be extended up to 15 years. For further details of Law 43 and its amendments
see Driscoll et al. and Carr (n. 4 above).
16. A separate law. New Communities Law (Law No. 25 of 1979), provides further
encouragement to industrial projects located in new desert cities—Al Ashir min
Ramadan, Madinat Sitta Uktuber, and Madinat as-Sadat. On the growth of these
industrial centers, see Gunter Meyer, "Industrial Expansion in the new Desert Cities
in Egypt," (University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, mimeo) paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the Middle East Studies Association, November 1988.
17. Two types of free zones are envisaged by the Law: public and private. Public
free zones consist of pre-designated stretches of land where projects with a
free-zone status may be located. Private free zones are the sites of individual
projects also covered by the free-zone provisions of the Law but located outside
public free zones. Currently, five different public free zones exist in Cairo,
Alexandria, Suez, Port Said, and Ismailia. A sixth one is under construction in
Adabiya, Suez, and a seventh one is being planned for Damietta.
18. Most of these projects were approved in five hours on March 27, 1977. See John
Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 145-146.
19. In 1981, Law 159, the New Companies Law, extended some of the tax privileges of
Law 43 to the domestically-owned joint stock, limited partnership, and limited
liability companies. This law also substantially relaxed the previously-imposed
tight regulations on such enterprises. This development may partially account for
the decline of investment under Law 43. However, as we note below, it is the decline
in foreign equity that is the more problematic part in the trends of such
investments. See also note 21.
20. Taking account of inflation, of course, would prove the decline to be even more
dramatic. For example, deflation by the Egyptian wholesale price index shows a
(real) decline of almost 82% in the value of annual capital approvals between 1981/82
and 1985/86.
21. It is important to keep in mind that the increase in the Egyptian share has come
about despite the fact that investment under the New Communities Law of 1979 (see n.
16 above) and the New Companies Law of 1981 (see n. 19 above), which compete with
investment under Law 43, have become increasingly attractive to Egyptian investors.
It is also interesting to note that the increased share of Egyptian capital has
largely come about through increases in the share of wholly Egyptian-owned
enterprises, and to a much lesser extent through increased equity shares in joint
ventures. The share of wholly Egyptian-owned, inland projects in the total capital
committed under Law 43 increased from 26% in 1980 to 50% in 1984 {MEN, December
4, 1981, p. 13, and February 1, 1985, p. 5). At the same time, the share of the public
sector in the Egyptian equity of inland projects has been declining. This share has
stood at 38%, 36%, 35.1%, and 31.7% in the middle of 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987,
respectively (,\/£/V, February 1, 1985, p. 5, and NBE, 1985, No. 3, p. 260; 1986, No. 4,
p. 275; 1987, No. 3, p. 171).
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22. This difference may partly be due to the absence of minimum local participation
requirements. However, it should be pointed out that the share of Egyptian capital
among inland projects is far greater than the minimum requirements set by the Law.
The focus of Egyptian entrepreneurs on inland projects is likely to be due to their
comparative advantage in conducting business within Egypt when compared to Arab
entrepreneurs who can benefit more from free-zone projects linked to their home
countries. It is interesting to note that Egyptian private investors contribute a
much smaller share of the Egyptian capital in free-zone projects than in inland
projects. By the mid-1984 the public sector had taken up more than 47% of the
Egyptian capital going to the free zones as opposed to 38 percent going to inland
projects {MEN, February 1, 1985, p. 5).
23. See, for example, NBE, 1985, No. 3, p. 257. It is notable that as a result of
approval cancellations and reduced project proposals, the percentage of inactive
approved inland projects (i.e., those neither operating nor under implementation) in
terms of number has dropped from over 32% in 1977 to about 21% in 1985 and less than
17% in 1987. The corresponding figures in terms of total approved capital are 43.7,
26.4, and 20.7. The percentage of inactive projects in 1976 was somewhat lower:
30.4% in terms of number and 37.6% in terms of capital. (These data are based on
NBE, 1976 and 1977, MEN, January 30, 1987, and NBE, 1987, No. 1,2.)
24. The wholesale price index, of course, is not an ideal deflator for investment
expenditures. Moreover, applying such a deflator to the book value of capital of
enterprises that start their operations in a given year does not properly account for
price changes during the gestation period of each project. However, these concerns
do not seem to have much practical significance since, fortunately, the shares
calculated in Table 8 are by and large insensitive to the deflation method and the
choice of deflator (or even lack thereof).
25. These sectors consist of agriculture, manufacturing, mining, electricity,
construction, transportation and communication, trade, finance, insurance, and
tourism. Excluded sectors are petroleum, housing, public utilities, and government
and social services. For some of the comparisons the agricultural sector is also
excluded because the types of investment and employment in agricultural Law 43
projects are somewhat different from the typical investment and employment in family
farms, which dominate that sector. It is interesting to note that the actual average
wage rate paid by agricultural projects is much higher than the going wage rate in
the agricultural sector and, indeed, quite close to the average wage rate in the
construction sector. In 1987, the average wage in agricultural projects was only 2%
below the wage rate in the construction sector and about three times the one in the
agricultural sector (based on MEN, May 12, 1989, and NBE, 1987, No. 1-2).
26. Table 10 provides the data for the sectoral composition of nonfinancial,
operating, inland projects. Similar data for free-zone projects is not directly
available. However, given the high rate of implementation among free-zone projects
(see Table 7), the sectoral composition of approved ones given in Table 13 can be
taken as a reasonable proxy.
27. For the value of stock of capital in other developing countries, see UNCTC (n. 2
above). Table XXI. 6. In that table, the stock of foreign investment in Egypt in 1984
is recorded as $14.9 billion, which, as indicated by the observations in this paper,
is the total nominal value of investments approved under Law 43 by that time.
28. See, for example. Cooper (n. 4 above), p. 109.
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29. See two articles in MEED, June 30, 1989, and November 10, 1989, that discuss the
main concerns of Egypt's private sector regarding Law 230.
30. UNCTC (n. 2 above), p. 85.
31. Presence of non-Arab (especially U.S.) capital in the Egyptian petroleum sector
is also quite prominent (Galal A. Amin, "Adjustment and Development: The Case of
Egypt/' in Said El Naggar, ed.. Adjustment Policies and Development Strategies in the
Arab World, International Monetary Fund, 1987), However, this branch of foreign
investment is beyond the scope of the present paper.
32. It should be pointed out that the project wages paid to Egyptian workers must
have been about 15% below the figures shown in Table 17 because the data in that
table include the high salaries of foreign employees. Table 15 is helpful in
demonstrating this point for the approved projects by the end of 1982. Such a low
pay may, to some extent, be due to a higher proportion of women in the workforce
of Law 43 projects. However, no data could be found in this regard.
33. Note that employment and fixed investment in finance projects are quite small
and, thus, can be ignored in these comparisons.
34. See Abdel-Rahman and Abu Ali (n. 4 above), p. 161.
35. This information is based on NBE, 1987, No. 1-2, Tables 2/4c and 2/7b.
36. For a discussion of the role and activities of Infitah banks see Moore (n. 4
above)
37. According to a Shura Council study published in 1986, only 4% of foreign
currency attracted to the Infitah financial institutions were from non-Egyptians,
while 21% of the assets were placed outside Egypt [quoted from McDermott (n. 4
above), p. 146].
38. The data in this paragraph is quoted from MEN, February 13, 1987, p. 8.
39. See the Shura Council study cited in note 37 above.
40. The year 1983 seems to have been a better year for Law 43 exports because
Shafik (n. 4 above) reports that between 1974-86, projects exported only 6% of
their output (p. 12).
41. See Shafik (n. 4 above), p. 11.
42. See, for example, David Butter, "Debt and Egypt's Financial Policies," in Charles
Tripp and Roger Owen, Egypt under Mubarak, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 127.
43. Between 1981 and 1985, the total number of tourists in Egypt has increased by
more than 10%. However, total tourist-nights and tourism revenues have slightly
declined during the same period.
44. UNCTC (n. 2 above), p. 74.
45. See UNCTC (n. 2 above), p. 80.
46. Article 22 of the amended Law 43 states that: "Projects that are basically not
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export oriented, and that limit the country's need for imports, shall be permitted to
transfer, in whole or in part, their net profits at the highest rate prevailing and
declared for foreign currency within the limits approved by the [Investment]
Authority and subject to the currency regulations in force." Export-oriented
projects, on the other hand, are expected to generate their own foreign exchange
which can be used for the purpose of profit repatriation.
47. Note that between 1980/81 and 1986/87 the investment volume of approved
free-zone projects has declined much faster than those of approved inland projects,
reflecting the substantial loss of profitability in export-oriented projects and
confirming the overvaluation of the Egyptian pound in this period. The opposite is
true between 1986/87 and 1988 when some exchange-rate policy reforms were
implemented.
48. See Shafik (n. 4 above), p. 12.
49. MEN, May 19, 1989, p. 13.
Table 1
Gross Doiestii: Product, Investnent, Balance of Payiients, and External Debt
GDPt Fixed I fivestiiient* Foraig ^ Recepi ts and Payments E: ternal Df?bt
gpi Rate m Worker Current Total Debt Debt Service
Noiinal Deflated of Nominal Deflated Exports Remit. Imports Account Debt As I of As -1. of
Year (LE in) Index Growth (LE m) Index ($ «n) ($ inn) ($ m) ($ m) ($ lan) Exports Exports
1974 4190 100.0 -2.5 643 100.0 2333 139 4165 -1638 2960 126.6 22.1
1975 5168 109.7 9.7 1335 184.6 2589 365 5471 -2516 4933 192.5 23.0
1976 6653 133.3 21.5 1462 190.3 3391 755 5596 -1450 6018 177,5 19.6
1977 8210 149.1 11.9 1838 217.5 4001 397 6417 -1519 3467 211.5 27.7
1973 9733 161.1 3.1 2633 283.0 4243 1761 7419 -1415 10703 252.3 29.0
1979 12610 187.4 16.3 3707 359.0 5707 2445 10156 -2004 12464 218.4 18.5
1980 15312 205.5 9.7 4062 344.0 7037 2696 11300 -1517 15735 222.7 21. S
1931 17149 194.9 -5.2 5108 378.3 8207 2355 13481 -2419 18379 24.6
1932 20831 219.1 12.4 5469 373.9 3430 1935 13917 -3552 21214 251.6 25.0
1983 24834 238.3 8.8 5399 400.2 8870 3155 14411 -2376 23184 251.4 24.9
1934 23600 237.0 -0.6 6710 362.3 9561 3931 16556 -3064 25136 262,9 23.6
1985 34211 257.3 8.6 7272 356.4 9754 3436 18011 -4761 29041 297.7 23.5
1936 38221 253,9 -1.3 7752 335.6 3754 2973 17074 -5347 32093 366.6 Li. I L
1937 44050 249.6 -1.7 7700 284.3 8051 2845 14634 -3778 34515 423,2 -«*
1988 52100 259.7 4.1 9163 297.6 - - - - - - -
t Year ending in June.
» In this and all other tables, a dash ("-") means that the corresponding figure is not available.
Sources: GDP and Investaent; IIIF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
Wholesale Price Index fWPI): National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin
,
various issues;
Trade and Debt data: World Bant, World Tab las, 1933-39 and Horld Debt Tables, various years.
Tabl e 2
National Accounts as Shares
(Percen
of Gross
tagesi
Ooisestic Product
Govern - Gross Net Resource Gap:
Private lent Fixed Increase Factor Ev;i— of Imports over
Consui- Consuffl-- Capital in Less Income Exports and Net Factor
Year tion tion Foriat. Stocks exports Imports GDP Abroad GNP Income Abroad as 7, of GNP
1973/74 63.5 26.3 15.3 1.9 21.2 -33.3 100.0 .•:'
•
97.3 14,7
1974/75 67.5 23.5 25.8 1.9 18.3 -37.2 100.0 .0 9 97.1 21.7
1975/76 62.6 23.6 22.0 2.9 15.5 -26.6 100.0 ~ I 93.0 13.1
1975/77 59.9 20.7 22.4 5.8 21.5 -31.4 100.0 c-J 3 94.7 15.0
1977/73 64.0 13.3 27.0 4.3 19.9 -33.9 100,0 -10 90.0 24.0
1978/79 65.1 15.2 29.4 4.7 25.6 -43.0 100.0 5 i. 105.2 10.2
1979/30 69.7 15.1 25.7 1.7 27.3 -40.5 100.0 7 6 107.6 5.6
1980/81 55.0 16.5 29.8 0.5 30.9 -42.9 100.0 7 7 1(^.7 4.3
1931/82 69.1 16.4 26.2 0.5 26.9 -39,1 100,0 ) 1 102.1 10.1
1982/83 65.7 16.7 25.8 0.3 24.8 m n 100.0 4 9 104.9 4,1
1933/34 70.3 17,3 23.5 0.7 22.3 -34.0 100.0 7 107.0 4.7
1934/85 ^1.4 15.7 21.3 0.6 19.3 -29.2 100.0 4 s 10^.9 5.0
1935/86 71.3 16.0 20.3 1.0 15.8 -24,
i
100.0
^
i 103.1 5.6
1986/87 77.3 14.4 17.5 1.0 14.1 -24.3 100.0 4 5 104.6 6.0
1937/33 79.4 13.2 17.6 13.4 -23.6 100.0 - -
Source: Based on IHF, Internationa Financia Statisti ^, vari' us ye us
Table 3
Multiple Exchange Rates in Egypt, 1930-1987
(U.S. dollars per Egyptian pound at the end of each year)
The Rate Applicable to the Foreign Exch. Pool of: Central Bank Coniifier. Bank
-- Rate as I of Rate as I of
Year Central Bank Cobub. Banks "Own-Exchange" Black Market Own-Exch. Rate Own-Exch. Rate
1374 2.56 1.70 - 1.44
1975 2.56 1.70 1.43 1.42 179.0 113.9
1976 2.55 1.43 1.37 1.35 186.9 104.4
1977 2.:: 1.43 1.45 1.43 176.6 93.6
1978 2.56 1.43 1.37 1.34 186.9 104.4
1979 1.43 1.43 1.35 1.33 105.9 105.9
1980 1.43 1.20 1.34 1.31 105.7 89.5
1931 1.43 1.20 1.05 1.00 136.2 114.3
1932 1.43 1.20 1.00 0.93 143.0 120.0
1933 1.43 1.20 0.85 0.86 168.2 141.2
1984 1.43 1.20 0.73 0.75 195.9 164.4
1935 1.43 0.75 0.58 0.53 246.6 129.3
1986 1.43 0.74 0.52 0.50 275.0 142.3
1937 1.43 0.53 0.44 - 325.0 120.5
1988 1.43 0.43 0.40 - 352.9 105.0
1989 0.91 0.39 0.37 - 246.4 105.9
* Parallel rate before 1979.
Sources: 1974-36: International Currency Analysis, Inc., yorld Currency Yearbook
,
1984-1987;
1987-39: IMF, International Financial Statistics, August 1938.
Table 4
Project Approvals under La'^ 43
Investient Pi'o.jects inside the iCountry I n vest,lent Projects m (f-iii hjn:?s
No.
Capiital Investment Costs
No.
Capi tal [nvestiaeiIt Costs
Year LE iJin 1JS$ unt LE 9in IJS$ mi LE an IJ3$ mi LE mn lis? inn*
1974/75 110 442.3 75*1.9 439.3 331.3
-*1
21.1 35.9 22.1 37.
S
1975/76 80 394.3 670.3 850.3 1452.5 53 141.1 239.9 145.9 :js.o
1976/77 91 605.2 365.4 1546.5 2211.5 35 53.3 76.9 -7 <^J ; .J > ?
1977/78 124 421.1 602.2 616.6 881.7 50 38.5 55.1 51.8 38,4
1973/79 118 319.8 457.3 538.4 341.4 20 21.3 30.5 1
* r
JO , Ci
1979/80 130 455.4 552.7 857.1 1225.7 23 20.8 29.7 29.3 42.8
1930/31 201 360.9 1033,1 1899.2 2279.0 45 77.3 92.3 174.0 203.8
1981/82 150 546.4 -lie 1// J. / 1584.3 1901.2 11 55.2 79.4 134.9 151.9
1982/33 100 391.4 469.7 632.7 319.2 29 150.0 130,0 131.2 217.4
1983/84 155 793.0 957.6 1343.0 1611.5 O 36.2 43.4 87.4 104.9
1984/85 73 451.6 541.9 1110.5 1332.6 5 13.1 15.^ 26.0 31.2
1985/86 82 300.2 225.2 820.5 515.4 T 5.4 4.3 8.5 6.4
1986/37 37 512.3 379.1 1072.4 / io.o 7 14.5 10.7 21.6 16.0
1988 87 687.0 :29.3 1188.0 570.2 12 48.0 23,0 65.0 31.7
Con/er ted at thiB cowmerciai-bank?> excnanqe rate (see Table 3.!
Sources: 19 74/75- 1936/37: National Bank of Eclypt, Econ.jiHIc 3u11 i^ub r:3 7, No5. 1-•2 and 3;
19 33: ,1:iddle Ea;it News Agency, EcorlOffllC Weirr.i[j_, May 4 , lj90.
Table 5
Part-idpition of Countries in the Cuinulative Capital of
Projects Approved under Law 43
(Percentages)
Arab United E.E.C. Other
Year Egypt Countries States Countries Countries Total
Inland * r '
1'377 50 24 b 20 100
1979 55 17 9 5 14 100
1980 58 12 8 S 14 lOO
1982 61 23 4 5 7 100
1984 71 15 4 & 4 100
1985 - - V
'
1986 71 14 15 100
1987 70 14 5 6 5 100
1988 - - ^ r '
1989 67 16 17 100
Free Zones
1984 3B 31 7 6 18 100
1987 31 47 8 5 11 100
1988 - - ^
'
r38'J 35 43 22 100
Sources: National Bank of Saypt, Econohiic Bulletin, and
Middle East l^ews Agency, Economic Heekly , various issues.
Table 6
Cumulative Capital and Investment Costs of Operating Law 43 Projects
Investment Projects inside the Country Investment Projects in Free Zones
Capital Invest,iient Costs Capital Investment Costs
Year No. LE mn US$ ran* LE in US$ mn* No. LE m US$ m* LE ,7in USI tir*
1976 80 149.0 213.1 ----- - -
1977 197 197.0 231.7 247.0 353.2 - - . - -
193U» 392 999.1 1324.4 1434.3 1897.3
1982 552 1532.5 2024,5 24!b.O 3074.3
1984»t 637 2326.5 2917.3 3753.4 4679.7
1935 793 3213.0 3535.9 5832.4 6128.4
1935 806 3327.0 3665.6 5929.0 6308.9
1937 323 3440.0 3728.5 6142.0 8421.3
1989»» 901 4604.0 4203.7 8390.0 7343.5
Co[«puted fay applying the average prevailing cofflsercial-Danks exchange rate (see Table 3) t'
incresental values between consecutive observations.
» llid-year values.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Ec on otic Bu ll etin
,
and Middle East Nejs Agency,
203 225.2 294.0 358.2 453.1
250 338.0 485.3 507.0 644.0
251 427.9 536.1 630.9 792.7
244 833.7 377.9 1118.7 1157.:
241 877.3 873.2 1108.9 1151.3
233 382.0 375.7 1127.0 1180.9
225 952.0 903.5 1228.0 1202.3
Table 7
Proportions of Approved Law 43 Projects Coapleted and Operating at the End of Various Years*
(Percentages)
Industrial Financial Agricultural Construction Services Total Inland Free Zones
Year No. Capital No. Capital No. Capital No. Capital No. Capital No. Capital No. Capital
1976 34.0 12.5 41.7 71.9 0.0 0.0 16.7 1.8 20.0 11.2 29.6 27.3
1981" 41.8 20.4 40.8 48.8 15.7 34,9 29.8 17.9 29.9 12.6 35.8 29.5 60.6 52.9
1982 45.9 22.2 45.2 41.8 33.0 50.8 42.4 20.6 38.8 22.9 43.4 31.6 69.3 22.0
1984" 49.2 27.8 58.6 73.9 40.4 48.6 51.1 22.0 54.3 32.4 53.6 43.6 81.1 68.3
1985 50.1 38.8 89.4 93.6 37.5 45.5 53.2 33.9 65.0 40.1 59.1 54.5 86.8 53.7
1986 52.8 39.3 36.1 91.1 40.6 47.5 50.8 27.5 63.5 45.0 59.5 54.0 39.9 94.3
1987 53.5 38.6 83.3 89.5 40.0 45.0 52.5 27.2 64.8 43.1 59.7 52.1 87.5 93.5
1989" 51.2 58.5 78.1 74.0 55.9 57.1 55.3 47.7 55.3 50.7 55.2 51.4 86.2 89.4
» Excluding projects that have closed down or have lost their approval status.
Mid-year values.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoiic Bulletin, and Middle East News Agency, Econoaic Weekly, various
issues.
Table 3
Share of Nonfinancial Inland Law 43 Projects in the Cusulative,
UPI-Deflated, Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Egypt Since 1974*
Percent of Investment in Relevant Sectors*** Percent of
_ In vest tent in
Year Industry Agriculture Construction Services Total All Sectors
1981** 5.9 8.5 25.3 3.3 5.0 4.3
1982 7.8 10.2 31.0 7.0 8.7 6.1
1984" 10.8 10.5 35.4 7.2 10.3 7.3
1985 15.5 9.4 43.1 9.3 13.4 9.4
1986 14.4 8.7 37.0 9.0 12.5 8.7
1987 13.8 7.8 34.8 8.7 11.9 8.2
* The values of Law 43 investments are deflated by the average wholesale price
index corresponding to increaental values between consecutive observations.
*» Mid-year values.
» The relevant sectors for industrial projects are aanufacturing, lining, and
electricity, for agricultural projects, agriculture, for construction
projects, construction, and for finance and service projects, transportation
and cotiunication, trade, finance, insurance, and tourist.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econotic Bulletin, and
Middle East News Agency, Econoaic Weekly, various issues.
Table 9
Sectoral Distribution of Inland Projects Approved Annually under Lau 43
(Percentages)
Percentages c)f Total Capital Pel'centages of Tota 1 Investment Costs
Year Indust - Finan- Agricul - Constru- Indust- Finan- Agricul- Constru-
rial cial tural ction Service Total rial cial tural ction Service Total
1974/75 00 1 59.9 0.0 0.9 16.0 100.0 21.0 66.3 0.0 2.0 10.7 100.0
1975/76 - . _ 32.4 2.2 1.3 26.9 100.0 46.7 18.4 2.2 0.9 31.8 100.0
1976/77 20.2 19.5 12.3 6.5 41.4 100.0 42.3 10.0 12.1 4.7 30.9 100.0
1977/78 16.2 51.8 6.9 7.8 17.3 100.0 21.1 35.4 6.4 10.6 26.5 100.0
1978/79 39.7 28.7 2.9 10.8 17.8 100.0 50.1 15.6 3.6 10.2 20.5 100.0
1979/80 21.8 45.0 3.6 13.1 16.4 100.0 27.6 27.3 3.8 24.7 15.5 100.0
1980/81 51.5 33.6 4.5 4.3 6.1 100.0 66.0 15.2 5.5 4.9 8.3 100.0
1981/82 59.2 16.7 2.7 6.2 15.1 100.0 75.6 5.8 2.5 5.0 9.0 100.0
1982/83 32.5 17.5 7.1 26.2 16.8 100.0 37.6 10.0 7.9 24.2 20.3 100.0
1983/84 43.9 21.8 7.9 15.1 11.3 100.0 47.5 13.0 9.8 15.8 13.8 100.0
1984/85 23.4 25.3 7.0 20.2 24.1 100.0 36.1 8.0 5.0 24.3 26.6 100.0
1985/86 56.8 0.8 1.1 28.9 12.4 100.0 53.6 0.3 0.7 24.9 10.5 100.0
1986/87 38.1 16.4 4.1 17.8 23.7 100.0 39.6 7.8 4.8 18.5 29.1 100.0
1988 40.2 43.4 2.5 0.9 13.1 100.0 58.1 25.1 2.2 1.5 13.1 100.0
Sources: 1974/75- 1986/87: National Bank of Egypt, Econoiic Bullel.v}j 1987, Nos. 1 -2;
1988: Middle East News Ag ency, Ec.onoiic Weekly, Hay 4, 1990.
Table 10
Sectoral Distribution of Operating Projects inside Egypt under Law 43
Year
Percent of
Total
Capital
in
Financial
Projects
Percent of
Total Non-Finance Capital
Indust- Agricul- Constru-
rial tural ction Service
Percent of
Total
Investaent
in
Financial
Projects
Percent of
Total Non-Finance Investaent Costs
Indust- Agricul- Constru-
rial tural ction Service
1975 76.4 50.0 0.0 5.1 44.9
1981* 58.9 51.3 15.5 11.0 22.1
1982 55.0 43.6 15.2 10.7 30.6
1984* 52.9 50.0 12.7 9.5 27.7
1985 48.9 53.0 9.0 11.7 25.3
1986 47.2 53.3 9.5 10.3 27.0
1987 45.7 54.2 8.9 10.
1
::,3
41.9 43.4 17.3 17.9 21.4
37.7 39.8 14.7 13.7 31.8
35.0 48.6 12.8 12.2 25.4
30.0 55.1 8.2 11.4 25.2
28.7 55.1 8.8 10.2 25.9
27.7 55.7 8.4 10.0 25.9
1989* 37.9 54.7 8.8 12.2 24.3 22.3 57.5 8.4 11.5 22.6
Hid-year values.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, and Hiddle East News Agency, Econoaic Weekly,
various issues.
Table 11
Participation of Countries in the Cuaulative Capital of Approved Law 43 Projects
by Sector, 19B4 and 19B7
(Percentages)
Arab United E.E.C. Other
Egypt Countries States Countries Countries Total
Type of
Activity 1984 1987 1984 1987 1984 1987 1984 1987 1984 1987 1984 1987
Inland Projects 71 70 15 14 4 5 6 6 4 5 100 100
Industrial
Financial
Agricultural
Construction
Services
74
70
76
78
60
72 8
70 21
76 15
88 16
56 19
9
19
14
9
17 14 14
100 100
100 100
100 100
100 100
100 100
Free Zone Projects 38 31 31 47 7 18 11 100 100
Sources: Middle East News Agency, Econoaic Meekly, February 1, 1985, and National Bank of
Egypt, EconoMJc Bulletin, No.3, 1987.
Table 12
Sectoral Structure of Gross Doaestic Incose*
(Percentaaes of Total GDP at Factor Cost in Each Year)
Agricul- Petro- nanuf. ti Constru- Elect- Transp. & Suez Trade i Public Ot ner
Year ture leua nining ction ricity CoBiunic. Canal Finance Housing Utilities Tour 1 SB Services
1974 34.1 2.5 18.3 3.6 1.3 4.5 - 10.3 3.4 0.4 - 21.1
1975 30.7 3.1 17.8 4.5 1.5 5.1 - 13.3 2.7 0.4 - 20.8
1976 28.3 4.2 17.4 4.6 1.5 7.8 - 12.6 2.6 0.4 - 20.6
1977 26.1 5.7 17.5 4.8 1.5 8.3 - 12.4 2.5 0.4 - ;o.8
1978 25.0 6.1 17.4 4.6 1.4 6.0 2.8 13.9 2.4 0.4 - 20.1
1979 23.6 8.4 17.2 4.7 1.5 5.1 3.3 13.4 2.4 0.4 - 20.0
1980 22.2 8.1 17.4 5.4 1.5 5.4 3.8 13.2 L ^J 0.4 - 20.3
1981/82 19.8 15.0 13.6 4.7 0.6 4.4 3.5 18.3 1.8 0.2 1.2 15.9
1982/83 18.4 15.7 13.8 4.9 0.6 4.9 3.2 18.8 1.9 0.2 1.2 16.3
1983/84 17.9 15.8 14.1 4.7 0.7 5.9 3.0 18.3 1.9 0.3 1.2 16.2
1984/85 16.6 14.6 15.9 4.5 0.7 6.1 2.6 19.8 2.0 0.3 1.1 15.8
1985/85 16.9 14.3 14.7 4.7 0.8 7.6 2.4 19.0 2.0 0.4 1.0 15.1
1986/87 16.7 14.8 13.9 4.4 0.9 7.8 2.2 19.2 2.1 0.4 1.1 16.5
» Based on constant price indices: 1974 based on 1973 factor costs; 1975 based on 1974 factor costs; 1975-1930 based
on 1975 factor costs; 1981/82-1986/87 based on 1981/82 factor costs.
Source: Coiputed froi National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, various issues.
Table 13
Cuaulative Sectoral Distribution of Free Zone Projects Approved under Law 43
(Percentages of Total at Mid-Years)
Percentages of Total Capital Percentages of Total Investaent Costs
Year Indust- Finance Indust- Finance
rial k Trade Service Storage Total rial 4 Trade Service Storage Total
1986 14.6 45.7 25.2 14.5 100.0 16.1 35.6 31.6 16.7 100.0
1987 14.9 45.3 24.4 15.5 100.0 17.8 35.2 30.0 17.0 100.0
Source: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, 1986, No. 4, and 1987, No. 3.
Table 14
Efflployient in Law 43 Projects
(Including Both Egyptians and Foreigners)
Eaployaent in
Approve d Projects Eaployaent in Oper ating Pro'jects
Inland Free Zone Iiiland Free Zone
Nuaber Nuiber Nuiber 1 of I of :: of Nuaber I of I of Z of
Year COOO) COOO) COOO) RSE1» RS£2»* RSE3»» COOO) RSE1» RSE2t» RSE3J"
1979+ 151.0 32.0 44.0 0.57 1.22 5.36 9.4 0.12 0.26 1.14
1982 200.8 20.6 - - - - - - - -
1984+ 210.8 18.1 83.1 0.96 1.93 5.45 14.2 0.16 0.33 0.93
1985 224.0 19.0 - - - - - - - -
1986 204.0 17.6 138.0 1.61 3.36 10.42 14.6 0.17 0.36 1. 10
1987 205,0 18.0 140.7 1.59 3.28 9.30 15.0 0.17 0.35 0.99
1989+ 205.3 17.6 157.8 - - - 15.4 - - -
+ Hid-year values.
RSEl: Total eaployaent in the relevant sectors of the econoay as defined in Table 8.
* RSE2; Total eaployaent in the relevant sectors of the econoay except agriculture.
»* RSE3: Post-1974 increase in eaployaent in the relevant, non-agricultural sectors of the
econoay.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, and Middle East News Agency,
Econoaic Weekly, various issues.
Table 15
Projected Eaployaent and Wages in Approved Law 43 Projects, Deceaber 31, 1932
Tot al Forei gners
Egypt ians
Eapl oyaent Uage Rate
Type of
Activity
Eaploy-
aent
COOO)
Average
Uage
(L£)
Eiploy-
eent
COOO)
Average
Uage
(LE)
Nuaber
COOO)
I of Total in
Relevant Sectors
of the Econoiy*
Average
Value
(LE)
7. 1
Reli
of
of Average in
Bvant Sectors
the Econoay*
Inland Projects 200.8 1431.3 3.0 13133.3 197.8 2.4 1253.8 235.7
Industrial II3.1 1559.7 1.0 21600.0 112.1 7.5 1380.9 150.7
Agricultural i
Construction 54.3 1029.5 0.5 10655.7 53.7 1.1 921.8 387.6
Finance &
Services 33.4 1649.7 1.4 8142.9 32.0 1.8 1365.6 133.6
Free Zones 20.6 2373.8 1.0 7500.0 19.6 0.5 2112.2 233.0
* For the definition of the relevant sectors for inland projects see Table 8. For free zones, the relevant
sectors are the saae as the inland ones except for agriculture.
Source: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, 1983, No. 1.
Table 15
Sectoral Distribution of Eaploysent in Inland Projects
Operating under Law 43
(Percentages)
Type of Activity
Indust- Agricul- Constru- Finance t
Year rial tural ction Services Total
1984* 45.5 7.5 33.1 13.8 100.0
1985 -----
1986 52.3 5.8 21.7 10.1 100.0
1987 53.0 5.4 21.2 10.4 100.0
1988 -----
1989* 62.2 6.4 19.9 11.5 100.0
Hid-year values.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic
Bulletin, and Middle East News Agency,
Econoaic Weekly, various issues.
Table 17
Esployment and Wages in Law 43 Projects, December 31, 1987
(Including Both Egyptians and Foreigners)
Approv ed Projects Operating Pr*ejects
Eaployaent yage Rate Eaployaent Uage Rate
I of Average I of I of 7. of Average 7. of
Type of Nuiber Total Value Average Nusber Total Increase Value Average
Activity COCO) in RSEl* (L£) in RSEl* COOO) m RSEl* in RSE4* (LE) in RSEl*
Inland Projects 205.0 3.0 1916.6 174.7 140.7 1.7 7.6 1208.1 110.1
Industrial 123.9 6.5 2057.6 129.5 88.6 4.6 12.1 1185.3 74.6
Agricultural 15.3 0.3 1825.8 354.0 7.6 0.2 2.3 1046.6 202.9
Construction 36.7 10.9 1307.6 123.6 29.8 8.9 139.5 971.6 91.9
Finance &
Services 29.1 1.4 2132.6 110.1 14.6 0.7 1.9 1912.2 98.7
Free Zones*** 18.0 0.4 2557.1 149.3 15.0 0.3 0.8 2470.5 144.3
Cairo 4.3 - 2328.8 - 3.8 - - 2131.5 -
Alexandria 7.1 - 3504.3 - 6.4 - - 3460.8 -
Suez 5.0 - 993.0 - 3.7 - - 1080.5 -
Port Said 1.5 - 3931.8 - 1.2 - - 2575.1 -
* RSEl: The relevant sectors of the econoay as defined m Table 8.
» RSE4: Post-1974 increase for the relevant sectors of the econoay.
*** For free zones, the relevant sectors ir^ saae as for inland ones except for agriculture.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin
,
1987, No. 1-2, and Hiddle East News
Agency, Econoaic Meekly, Hay 12, 1989.
Table 18
Wages in Law 43 Projects
(Including Both Egyptians and Foreigners)
Approved Projects Operating Project's
Inland U^e Zone Inland Free Zone
I of I of I of I of
Year LE LE LE RSEl** RSE2t** LE RSEl** RSE2***
1979* 1026.5 906.3 727.3 255.3 178.2 - - -
1982 1431.3 2373.8 - - - - - -
1984* 1665.6 - 1155.2 - - - - -
1985 1757.9 2736.8 - - - - - -
1986 1848.0 2551.1 1137.7 - - 2472.6 - -
1987 1916.5 2557.1 1193.3 110.1 70.6 2470.5 224.3 144.3
1989* 1952.8 2790.3 1469.8 - - 2531.8 - -
* Hid-year values.
* RSEl: Average wage rate in the relevant sectors of the econoay (see Table 8).
*** RSE2: Average wage rate in the relevant sectors of the econoay except agriculture.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, and Middle East News
Agency, Econoaic Weekly, various issues.
Table 19
Financial Situation of Operating Inland Law 43 Projects, 1934
Type of
Activity
Profitabl e Projects Losing Projects All Surv(•yed Projects
Paid-up
Capital Net Profit
No.
Paid-up
Capital Net Loss
No.
Paid-up
Capital Net Profit
No. LE an
as Z of
LE an Capital LE in
as I of
LE an Capital LE an
as I of
LE an Capital
Industrial 157 288.8 93.0 32.2 76 241.1 56.4 23.4 233 529.9 36.6 6.9
Agricultural St
Construction 63 91.1 34.5 37.9 32 87.9 32.0 36.4 95 179.0 2.5 1.4
Finance i
Services 166 994.9 209.6 21.1 75 322.9 95.4 29.5 241 1317.8 114.2 3.7
All Sectors 386 1374.8 337.1 24.5 183 651.9 183.3 28.2 569 2026.7 153.3 7.6
Source: General Authority for Investaent and ^r^z Zones, Report of the annual Activities, (Cairo, Narch 1986).
Quoted froa Table 5 of Ibrahia Helay Abdel-Rahian and Hohaaaed Sultan Abu All, "Role of the Public and
Private Sectors with Special Reference to Privatization: The Case of Egypt,' in Siad El-Naggar, ed..
Privatization and Structural Adjustaent in the Arab Countries
,
(Washington, D.C., International
Monetary Fund, 1989).
Table 20
Output of Nonfinancial Operating Inland Law 43 Projects
Total Value Sectoral Coaposition (X of Total:
as Z of Indust- Agricul- Constru-
Year LE an Noa. GNP rial tural ction Service
1979 150.0 1.1 - . -
19311 702.0 3.8 ^ -->, '
1982 1182.0 5.5 50.5 26.5 23.0
1983 1368.0 5.3 51.2 9.7 14.3 24.3
1984» 1812.8 5.9 54.5 8.5 16.2 20.9
Mid-year values.
Sources: Based on National Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin
,
and
Middle East News Agency, Econoaic Heekly, various issues.
Table 21
Sectoral Structure of Gross Fixed Capital Foraation
(Percentages of Total Fixed Investsient at Current Prices in Each Yeari
Year
Agricul- Petro- Manuf. i Constru- Elect- Transp. k Suez
ture leui Mining ction ricity Coiaunic. Canal
Trade i Public Other
Finance Housing Utilities Touriss Services
1S74 8.4 6.8 29.4 1.6 4.7 29.0
1975 7.6 9.2 21.6 2.4 4.3 30.4
1976 7.9 2.3 28.1 6.3 4.7 29.7
1977 8.5 3.6 31.3 2.6 5.1 26.9
1978 7.9 4.3 28.3 2.8 6.8 21.5 7.4
1979 9.2 3.4 22.3 3.2 7.7 24.7 6.8
1930 9.5 1.9 21.1 2.2 8.1 27.5
1981/82 10.6 3.3 24.0 2.2 7.9 22.9
1982/83 9.8 2.4 26.3 1.8 10.6 22.9 2.0
1983/84 10.1 2.1 26.3 2.3 11.0 21.5 1.5
1984/85 10.3 4.9 23.7 2.4 8.1 15.8 1.0
1985/86 12.8 4.5 23.0 2.4 8.2 16.4 0.9
1986/87 12.7 2.4 23.9 2.4 7.6 14.5 0.3
1937/88 11.2 1.1 26.6 2.6 8.8 15.2 0.6
Source: Coaputed froffl Natl onal Bank of Egypt, Econoaic Bulletin, varic
8 8.0 4.4 - 5.8
13.8 3.7 - 5.7
10.0 3.5 - 5.3
9.9 3.7 - 5.7
6.2 5.2 - 7.8
£.5 5.9 - 3.4
8.8 10.8 - 8.5
7.8 9.2 - 10.9
1.0 9.5 1.2 10.5
1.0 11.3 1.3 10.0
13.3 8.4 1.5 7.9
12.7 8.6 1.3 8.1
15.2 3.2 1.9 8.2
13.6 8.6 1.4 9.3
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